

Beyond Segmented Assimilation:  
Signaling Ethnolinguistic Identity with Language Preference

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### Abstract

According to ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT), immigrants weigh the social value of their ethnolinguistic community, and make decisions as to whether or not they will attempt to improve their community's value, depending on two factors: 1) if they have sufficient motivation to improve their status, and 2) if they have the agency to do so. Studying the variables that influence immigrants' decisions to prefer their heritage languages over English, I investigate how immigrants construct their ethnic identities in ways consistent with ELIT. Much of the recent literature studying immigrant incorporation into the United States focuses on the ways in which immigrants weigh the economic costs and benefits of expressing certain ethnic markers. While useful, this segmented approach to assimilation overlooks the meaningful, non-economic aspects of identity formation that immigrants undergo. I conduct complex regression analyses using Wave 1 of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) – a set of data that has frequently been used to defend segmented assimilation theory – and find support for ELIT as a possible alternative in explaining the variation in heritage language preference within immigrant communities.

## **Beyond Segmented Assimilation:**

### **Signaling Ethnolinguistic Identity with Language Preference**

In recent decades, immigration has become increasingly politicized in the United States. Recent estimates predict that first and second generation immigrants will comprise 36% of the United States' population by 2065 (Pew Research Center, 2015). Children of this large group of immigrants will attend schools, make language choices, and construct their ethnic identities amidst this politicization. As sociologists, we need to ensure that we take part in discourse about immigrant incorporation into society in a way that does not overlook the rich level of identity formation immigrants undergo. To help inform education scholars working to optimize dual-language programs that work with children of immigrants, sociologists need to provide scholarship that addresses the ways in which children of immigrants develop their identities and perceptions of their languages status (Cervantes-Soon, 2014, p. 68).

This study focuses on how immigrant youth growing up in turbulent political times make individual-level judgments about the value of their ethnic identities. I argue that ethnic identity, measured through non-English heritage language (HL) preference, is largely shaped by context of reception, including the presence of a co-ethnic community, discrimination, and parental economic capital. I examine how immigrants make judgments about dominant society, relative to their own ethnolinguistic community, which mediate the relationship between signaled identity and context of reception. To address these questions, I draw on Wave 1 of the 1991-2006 Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), including surveys given to 1.5 and second generation immigrants in the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale and San Diego areas.

This study takes place within a sociological climate that puts significant focus on studying how some immigrants do or do not assimilate into American society (See: Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Waters, et al., 2010; Waters and Jiménez, 2005;

Zhou and Bankston, 1994). More recently, sociologists have shifted towards studying assimilation within a framework that allows for discussion about the immigrants who undergo *segmented assimilation* via *selective acculturation*. When undergoing these processes, immigrants pick components of their heritage culture to hold onto, based on the costs and benefits of expressing certain components of their identities (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Waters, et al., 2010). These assimilation theory models capture how immigrants interact with, take on, and are influenced by American norms; however, they frequently ignore how racialization and ascribed ethnolinguistic status are intertwined with the ways immigrants construct ethnic meaning (Bashi Treitler, 2015, p. 161).

Alba (2002, p. 468) discusses the importance of studying language, calling it a “socially salient indicator of cultural differences and a marker of ethnic boundaries.” Language usage and aptitude has been at the center of many studies assessing how immigrants assimilate into society (Alba, et al., 2002; Alba and Nee, 2003; Portes and Schaufli, 1994; Waters, et al., 2010). While I agree that those who prefer English over their HLs are more assimilated into American society, I take the stance that analyzing language as merely a source of becoming less ‘foreign’ overlooks the complexity of how immigrants construct ethnic meaning. I argue that immigrants do not decide which language they prefer merely as a part of a macro-level assimilation trend; they make judgments about the value of the dominant society compared to their own. These judgments are constrained by the capital available to them and by their awareness of the differences in prestige assigned to their minority ethnolinguistic communities.

Many scholars take a segmented assimilation approach to studying immigrant incorporation, focusing on how immigrants construct their ethnic identities in response to the economic weighing of costs and benefits of signaling different economic markers. I approach immigrant incorporation from an ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT) perspective, focusing on

how immigrants construct their ethnic identities as a product of effortful attempts to preserve their ethnolinguistic communities' status. ELIT claims that individuals aim to increase their self-esteem by striving for positive social identities, so that they can view their social group as favorably distinct from others (Liebkind, 2010, p. 20). The theory explains that some immigrants signal their ethnic identity markers in response to perceiving their ethnolinguistic groups' status as both a) illegitimate, and *worth* working to change and b) unstable, and *capable* of being changed. ELIT has not been studied in a way that follows immigrants on a large quantitative scale. I intend to contribute ELIT as an important theory to include in sociological discussions of immigrant incorporation.

To defend ELIT as an approach in explaining variation in HL preference observed amongst the children of immigrant studied in the CILS database, I first confirm that a) heritage language preference varies significantly depending on national origin and national origin-dependent context of reception variables. Next, I b) determine whether judging the U.S. and its values as 'best' increases immigrant children's likelihood of signaling ethnic markers, such as HL preference. Finally, I c) study the interactions between the context of reception variables and judgments about dominant society that mirror the identity construction described in ELIT. I operationalize and test five hypotheses to test these three points. In the following section, I lay out the literature that led me to develop these hypotheses and defend the theoretical decision to study ELIT as it influences immigrant children's construction of their ethnic identities in racialized American society.

## **Literature Review**

### **Assimilation theory & racialization**

Assimilation theorists laid down the framework for discussing immigrant incorporation and the complex combination of factors that influence this process (Alba, et al., 2002; Alba and Nee, 2003; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Portes and Schauffler, 1994; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Rumbaut, 1994; Waters, et al., 2010; Waters and Jiménez, 2005; Zhou and Bankston, 1994). I use this framework as a launch pad for my discussion of ELIT.

Classic assimilation theory claims that incorporation into society is characterized by immigrants intermarrying with non-immigrants, increasing identification with the host, receiving less discrimination, and acquiring the host's culture and language (Gordon, 1964; Brown and Bean, 2006). In other words, assimilating into dominant society involves moving towards convergence with the majority (Brown and Bean, 2006; Gans, 1979; Gans, 1992; Gordon, 1964). Other assimilation scholars expanded on classic assimilation theory, examining the ways in which immigrants lose their distinctiveness as they spend more time in the United States, and as heritage culture is passed (or not passed) from one generation to the next. These scholars focus more on how societal barriers keep immigrants from integrating into society, including factors such as their race and co-ethnic concentrations within communities (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Waters, et al., 2010; Waters and Jiménez, 2005; Zhou and Bankston, 1994). Noticing changes in incorporation of Western Europeans, compared to that of newer migrants, Portes and Zhou (1993) concluded that differences in assimilation patterns could be explained by differences in immigrants' reception into society. This line of thinking led to the development of segmented assimilation theory.

Segmented assimilation theory was constructed to explain the ways in which some immigrants do not follow the typical straight-line assimilation path. Portes and Zhou (1993, p.

1172) claim that there are three paths an immigrant can take: 1) a path towards acculturation, followed by integration into the white middle class, 2) “permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass,” and 3) rapid economic advancement, with selectively preserved or ‘segmented’ community values. Immigrants pick which path they will undergo depending on what level of ethnic maintenance they assume will lead to intergenerational mobility for their children (Waters, et al., 2010, p. 1172).

Many segmented assimilation scholars assert that second generation immigrants hold onto their ethnic culture so they can receive support from their parents when faced with discrimination or when struggling to acquire host cultural knowledge (Mouw and Xie, 1999; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Waters, et al., 2010, p. 1172). Other scholars have pushed against this assertion, however, arguing that immigrants choose to preserve their ethnic characteristics not because they receive support from their parents, but because it helps them preserve ethnic ties within communities containing significant numbers of middle-class, educated co-ethnics (Waters, et al., 2010). Scholars in this latter category take a broader look at how ethnic embeddedness and social capital play a role in immigrants’ incorporation into society, but both groups of segmented assimilation theorists study how immigrants weigh the costs and benefits of maintaining components of their identities. My work comes close to these latter assertions of segmented assimilation theory, but focuses more on the ways in which immigrants express varying ethnic meaning in response to a context of reception-dependent non-economic factors.

**Ethnic identity construction via racialization.** I examine HL preference, not as a function of assimilating or not assimilating, but as an ethnic marker signaled in ways that are constrained by various forms of racialization. Racialization can sway some immigrants to lean more towards expressing markers that are either more prototypically “American” or more towards expressing those that prototypically “foreign” (Kibria, 2000, p. 87). Alba and Nee (2003,

p. 41) explain that assimilation results from attempts to pursue success and ‘American’ status. They claim that the pursuit of “familiar goals – a good education, a good job, a nice place to live, interesting friends and acquaintances, economic security” frequently results in assimilation (Alba and Nee, 2003, p. 41). Alternatively, ethnographic work reveals that ‘becoming American’ is not just a product of trying to achieve American success, but it is a product of race, given that racialization directly impacts how immigrants make sense of who they are amongst conflicting pressures to promote multiple identities (Bloemraad, 2013; Kibria, 2000).

Scholars who study racialization’s impact on immigrant identity construction echo Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903). Second and 1.5 generation immigrants not only deal with the challenges of negotiating two identities, but are also, in a way, expected to not be fully American if they express heritage markers the host society members expect them to express. Immigrants undergo *civic ostracism*, a process in which whites frame immigrants as inassimilable with whites due to so-called ‘cultural’ factors (Kim, 1999). As a result, many people treat Korean Americans and Chinese Americans as the same, given their belonging to the ‘Asian race’ (Kibria, 2000, p. 92). At the same time, when reporting on what it means to ‘be American,’ non-white immigrants discuss the importance of having an “American look” and adopting American practices such as speaking English (Bloemraad, 2013, p. 56). Immigrants interact within a system in which ‘being American’ is viewed as mutually exclusive of being ‘foreign.’

This concept of Du Bois’s *twoness* is especially visible historically as it applies to discourse about bilingualism. In 1915, Theodore Roosevelt stated, “We have room for but one language [in America], and that is the English language, for we intend to see that the crucible turns our people out as Americans, of American nationality, and not as dwellers in a polyglot boarding house” (Garcia, 2014, p. 64). Expressing similar discourse in 2003, a *Vanity Fair*



advice column author wrote, “Forget Spanish... As for everyone's speaking it, what twaddle! Who speaks it that you are really desperate to talk to? The help? Your leaf blower?” (Garcia, 2006).

Racialization of ethnic factors, such as language, constrains immigrants’ ethnic agency by leading them to change how they emphasize various parts of their identity in order to minimize the costs of performing ethnicity in other ways. For example, a Korean American discussed in Kibria’s (2000, p. 91) study reported that he chose to invest more time learning his heritage language when he was discriminatorily placed in a role at his work place where he was expected to be an ‘authentic Korean’ who expressed fewer prototypical American markers. A Chinese American parent reported wanting to raise his children valuing Chinese culture because, “It’s really important to value your background and culture, not just because it’s important to you, but because it’s important to everyone around you” (Kibria, 2000, p. 92). On the flip-side a 19-year-old Ecuadorian woman explained, “It’s an advantage to have my American and my Ecuadorian cultures. But, when I go to Ecuador, I don’t feel like I belong there because they say, ‘You are not really Ecuadorian, you’re American.’ And when I’m here, I’m not fully American.” These examples depict the struggles immigrants undergo in making decisions to be either ‘foreign’ or American. In their eyes, they may want to be both, but in others’ eyes, they cannot be both.

Taking racialization into account is especially important when studying immigrant children. Second and 1.5 generation immigrants are in a particularly challenging place, bridging their parents’ heritage background to the American culture within which they grew up. Speaking their heritage language gives children of immigrants the opportunity to link to themselves symbolically to their ethnolinguistic communities (Nesteruk, et al., 2015, p. 469). Immigrant children in English monolingual schools are exposed to the “American” marker of speaking

English, early and consistently as they grow up (Fillmore 1991, p. 342). Fillmore (1991, p. 342) writes, “Language-minority children... have only to turn on the television and they can see that they are different in language, in appearance, and in behavior, and they come to regard these differences as undesirable.” Language is one of the significant ways in which immigrant children experience ‘American’ vs. ‘foreign’ racialization, given that it is such a salient feature of Americanness.

### **Heritage language and context of reception**

Language preference is a purposeful way of constructing ethnic meaning. Immigrants who choose to avoid this shift from HL preference to English preference do so because they have both the motivation and the agency to do so. Such agency and motivation is influenced by a number of community of practice factors for which I will provide a background.

**Heritage language’s treatment as an ethnic marker.** Heritage language ability has strong ties to ethnic identity. Latin American descendants are four times more likely to identify as non-Hispanic if they only speak English, compared to those who speak some Spanish (Emeka and Vallejo 2011, p. 1558). As an ethnic marker, language can also be racialized to be ‘American’ or ‘foreign.’ Tokao Ozawa, a Japanese emigrant attempting to convince the United States Justice System that he deserved naturalization in 1914, wrote, “I am not an American, but at heart I am a true American,” and listed his qualities, which he felt proved his true Americanness. Alongside factors associated with classical assimilation, such as going to American schools and churches and marrying a white American woman, Ozawa listed speaking only American English in his home so that his children could not learn Japanese (Haney López, 1996, p. 80).

In addition to immigrants expressing a strong link between Americanness with speaking English, assimilation theorists also have tended to study heritage language ability or usage as a

measure of assimilation into America (Waters, et al. 2010). Many assimilation scholars agree that language is a means of ethnic signaling, describing language as a “socially salient indicator of cultural difference and a marker of ethnic boundaries” (Alba, 2002, p. 468; Alba and Nee, 2003). I regard the strong association between language preference and assimilation as significant evidence that language can be studied as a symbolic category tightly linked to ethnicity and Americanness.

**Context of reception.** Context of reception can be approached from many different perspectives. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) are credited with establishing the term *context of reception* to describe how immigrants interact within typical modes of incorporation into dominant society. Jones (2012) breaks context of reception into three factors: 1) racial meanings brought by immigrants and established as norms within the host community, 2) demographic factors related to economic growth, and 3) institutions and the support that they provide (or fail to provide). The timing in which these immigrants arrive likely influenced the effects of Jones’s (2012) three context of reception categories. It is also reasonable to assume that had immigrants come from different nations, or had immigrated at a different time, they would have faced radically different contexts of receptions, given that they likely would have interacted differently with economic systems, national and local policies, and racial norms (Portes and Schauffler, 1994; Foner and Kasinitz, 2007).

Sociolinguists understand context of reception variables as influencing minority languages speakers’ HL preference via a community’s ethnolinguistic vitality (EV), which I will explain in more detail in the next section (Crystal, 2002). Crystal (2002) states that having prestige and legitimate power – characterized by having a “strong presence in the educational system,” the ability to write in their language, and the ability to access language in their community – increases the likelihood that an ethnolinguistic community will prioritize their

heritage language. While I agree that these variables influence heritage language preference, I hypothesize this happens indirectly, by influencing minority languages speakers' views of their languages' ethnolinguistic vitality (EV), but I will discuss this mediating effect later.

Considering how HL preference is an ethnic marker constrained by context of reception variables, I generated the following two hypotheses:

***Hypothesis 1.*** Second generation immigrant heritage language preference varies depending on parental national origin.

***Hypothesis 2.*** The relationship between second-generation immigrant heritage language preference and parental national origin is mediated by context of reception. The context of reception variables I focus on are those tied up with ELIT. In following sections, I explain these specific factors in more detail.

### **Constrained ethnic identity construction: Ethnic agency, EV, & SIT**

Though context of reception is important in influencing identity expression, it does not directly determine language choices. Its effect is mediated in part by individuals' judgments about their community's prestige and ethnolinguistic vitality (EV) (Crystal, 2002). In this section, I explain how context of reception factors can constrain an individual's ethnic agency, impact their likelihood of judging their community's EV as illegitimate and unstable, and lead them to prioritize expressing markers.

Immigrants belonging to dominated racial groups have considerably less ethnic agency than those who belong to more powerful groups (Desmond and Emirbrayer 2009). For example, some non-white, dominated immigrants may recognize a need to emphasize their distinctive ethnic markers or to cleanse themselves from them all attempts to pass into dominant society. Others may not have enough agency to make these choices (Desmond and Emirbrayer 2009, p.

23). Either way, some ethnic choices cannot take place unless immigrants both recognize that they are dominated and have the agency to push against their domination.

Social psychologists explain this interaction more thoroughly. According to social identity theory (SIT), individuals aim to increase their self-esteem by striving for positive social identities so as to view their own group as favorably distinct from other groups (Liebkind, 2010, p. 20). Giles and Johnson (1987) formally extended SIT into the ethnolinguistic realm, establishing ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT), which posits that ethnic groups may adjust the performance of their identity depending on how they associate status with particular identity markers. According to ELIT, when individuals favor their language, they may take on features that make their group “favorably distinct” from others’, but if they are ashamed of their language, they may attempt to assimilate or “pass” into dominant society (Giles and Johnson, 1987; Liebkind, 2010). This process can explain language choices, but becomes more complicated upon considering the ways in which EV can manifest.

**EV judgments.** EV refers to the ability of an ethnolinguistic group to survive as a distinctive entity in the presence of other ethnolinguistic groups (Giles et al., 1977; Liebkind, 2010). High in-group status, high demographic strength, and high levels of institutional representation signal high EV. According to ELIT, high EV is usually associated with high in-group identity, but under some circumstances, it may be associated with low in-group identity (Giles et al., 1977; Liebkind, 2010).

Allard and Landry (1994) proposed a subjective vitality analysis model that addresses the conditional divergence from the positive association between EV and in-group ID (Liebkind 2010). Allard and Landry (1994) found that subjects’ evaluation of their ethnolinguistic community’s EV as either legitimate or illegitimate predicted respondent language choices. They also concluded that it is not just the objective EV that matters in influencing language

performance, but the subjective judgments about the EV, such as whether the EV is stable and thus a “lost cause,” or is unstable and is worth attempting to change (Allard and Landry, 1994; Liebkind, 2010). For many immigrants, the decision to reinforce ethnic markers depends on them 1) perceiving there being something that needs to be done to improve their group’s EV, and 2) seeing their group’s EV as unstable and thus changeable (Liebkind 2010). I will explain these two conditions, as they relate to specific context of reception factors, in more detail in the next two sections. Allard and Landry’s work with ELIT captures how immigrants do not just assimilate in response to economic motives, but also make specific judgments about their in-group’s ascribed EV in comparison to their in-group’s ideal EV. According to ELIT, judgments about one’s EV directly influence language preference (Allard and Landry, 1994; Liebkind, 2010). This led me to develop Hypothesis 3.

***Hypothesis 3.*** When second generation immigrants judge their ethnolinguistic group’s low EV as illegitimate, they have an increased likelihood of preferring their heritage language to English.

**Constrained ethnic agency.** Liebkind (2010) claims that, according to ELIT, there are two conditions that must be met for immigrants to work to push against their low EV and attempt to raise their in-group status via signaling their ethnic markers. First, immigrants must see their status as unstable and changeable, and second, they must have significant motivation to resist against the low EV dominant society ascribes to them. I will focus on the former condition first. Immigrants are unlikely to make such positive judgments about their community’s EV, and are thus unlikely to signal their ethnic markers, if they feel they are unable to improve their EV (Liebkind, 2010, p. 24). In other words, immigrants must have enough capital and agency in order to resist against their low status. Context of reception factors that regulate this agency include social capital and and parental economic capital.

Haugen (1987) explains that migration frequently is a ‘network’ decision, in which immigrants rely on economic and social support from friends and family who come from similar sending locations. Rather than having to immediately use English most of the time, or to find jobs without any resources other than their own, they share capital (Haugen, 1987; Massey, et al., 1994). According to segmented assimilation theory, living with co-ethnics constrains immigrants’ ethnic agency, given that immigrants are pushed to live with other immigrants and share their capital in order to minimize the costs of immigrating. Living in areas and attending schools with higher co-ethnic concentrations increases immigrant heritage language preference and usage (Tubergen and Mentjox, 2014; Emeka and Vallejo, 2011). This could happen in part because immigrants feel a need to share identities with those they interact with. For example, some immigrants report feeling like they should be more expressive of ethnic markers when they have received criticisms from co-ethnics as “acting white” or for no longer valuing their ethnic identity (Nesteruk, et al., 2015).

Even though this relationship between living with co-ethnics and HL preference could be explained by segmented assimilation theory, it could also be explained by ELIT. Living with co-ethnics can do more than just constrain immigrants’ choices to prioritize expressing their ethnic identity; it can provide immigrants with a group within which they can construct valued in-group ethnic identities. Living with co-ethnics can also increase individuals’ likelihood of having people around with whom they can speak their heritage language (Stevens, 1992, p. 181). If immigrants do not have other co-ethnics with whom they can speak their language and unite, then according to ELIT, motivation to resist against their low EV may be insignificant.

Social capital is one factor that I hypothesize positively regulates immigrants’ likelihood of viewing their low EV as unstable and changeable. Parental economic capital is another component that acts in such a way. Crystal (2002) argues that having a significantly high enough

amount of wealth in the community decreases the association between ethnolinguistic markers and a lack of upward mobility. This led me to develop Hypothesis 4.

**Hypothesis 4.** Having co-ethnic friends and having a sufficiently high economic status can lead to heightened perceptions that a community possesses capital and a high enough EV enable immigrants to respond by signaling their ethnic identity. If immigrants perceive that they have enough capital to increase their EV, then they have the functional ability to try to positively change their EV by signaling ethnic markers via HL preference.

**Decision making within ethnic agency.** Having a high enough EV increases immigrants' agency to value their ethnic markers as higher than dominant American English markers, but according to ELIT, this is not the only factor that determines whether immigrants will make these judgments. Immigrants must also have the motivation to work to improve their community's EV. I assume that having enough motivation to make a change is influenced by a) experiencing discrimination and b) having a significantly low socioeconomic status to decide that it is worth it to push against dominant society. Both of these factors increase the saliency of immigrants' ethnic identity and signal that they have a low ascribed EV in their community, without which, they would have no reason to resist against dominant society's ethnic markers (Liebkind, 2010).

In his early studies of 1.5 and second generation immigrants from Miami and San Diego, Rumbaut (1994, p. 20) found that those who experience discrimination and who believe that they will be discriminated against, no matter how much education they acquire, are less likely to identify as American and to instead show more loyalty towards their national-origin. One second-generation Chinese American man gave the following report in Kibria's (2000, p. 87) study:



“I’m not usually very conscious of being Chinese. When I’m conscious it’s because I’ve been reminded of it. But like the other day I was in a gas station and this lady was looking for directions. She came up to me and said, ‘Do you speak English?’ I was really kind of surprised, taken aback, it actually took me a minute to figure out what she was talking about. And I felt like, what the hell is she talking about? I can barely say a few words of Chinese.”

Increased awareness of one’s ethnic identity can make immigrants more likely to assert their identity. This was especially the case during the ethnic revitalization movements that took place in 1960s (Nagel, 1995; Phinney, 1990, p. 499). Liebkind (2010, p. 23-24) argues, “particularly for ethnic minority groups, identification can provide a buffer against possible aversive effects of group membership, such as perceived discrimination.”

Following the logic of ELIT, choices are constrained for individual immigrants. They realize that in order to have more capital, as well as a sense of belonging to a valued community, both of which they get from being a part of a co-ethnic community, they must defend their in-group identity and aim to increase their community’s EV. They will have little motivation to prioritize boosting their community’s EV, even if they have the agency to do so, unless they believe that their community is in a position worth defending.

Discrimination does not influence the part of EV related to ethnic agency. Rather, discrimination decreases a community’s ascribed EV. I argue that having individual capital can also evoke ethnic responses that are non-economic in their effects. Having low socioeconomic status, like being discriminated against, can evoke the perception of a community having an illegitimately ascribed low EV. Portes and Schauffler (1994, p. 644) argue that higher parental socioeconomic status leads immigrants to have lower rates of bilingualism, because having more capital provides children with more access to the cultural mainstream. This effect could also be

explained by ELIT, however. While immigrants need a certain level of economic capital to have significant ethnic agency, as previously discussed, if they have too much capital, then the effect of ethnic agency might not be significant at all because they might not recognize their low social status and how it might possibly be tied to their race or ethnicity (Allard and Landry, 1994; Liebkind, 2010). Those in dominant and privileged groups have agency to not think about their ethnic identity as a significant part of their identity; meanwhile, those in dominated groups do not have the agency to *not* think about their ethnicity (Desmond and Emirbrayer 2009, p. 23).

According to ELIT, when immigrants do not perceive themselves as having low EVs, likely because they neither have low socioeconomic status nor receive discrimination, they do not judge their EV as illegitimate. Instead of responding by valuing the expression of their own ethnic markers over those of dominant American English society, these immigrants thus have no extra motivation to increase their ethnolinguistic community's EV. This complex interaction between parental socioeconomic status, perceived discrimination, ethnic agency variables, and judgment variables led me to generate Hypothesis 5.

***Hypothesis 5.*** Having parents with high job prestige (an operationalization for economic capital) and not being personally discriminated against – both of which are a part of a positive context of reception – negatively moderate the effect of ethnic agency on the chance immigrants will judge their statuses as illegitimate, and therefore respond by expressing preference for their HL.

## Methods

To make the case for ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT) as a possible means of studying variation in HL preference amongst U.S. immigrants, I run the following described analyses with the immigrants surveyed in Wave 1 of the CILS database. This study is completely quantitative in its methodology. I assess individuals' responses to questions about HL preference, context of reception factors, and judgments about America's greatness. I conduct regression analyses to test certain components of ELIT, and examine how effect sizes of certain variables change upon controlling for the effects of variables I hypothesize to be related to them.

**Data.** I analyzed data from the first wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), a panel study that began in 1991 with over 5000 eighth and ninth grade immigrant children in the metropolitan areas of Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, and San Diego, California (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). All students surveyed were either 1.5-generation immigrants born outside of the United States, who immigrated prior to entering adolescence, or second-generation immigrants born in the United States. I analyzed Wave 1 to focus specifically on immigrant incorporation and identity formation amongst immigrant youth. Most of the children surveyed were eighth and ninth grade students when the survey was conducted.

My sample only included participants who reported having both parents born in the same countries. Doing this allowed me to focus on children of immigrants who experience the nationality-specific context of reception effects of only one national origin, rather than two (such as children of immigrants who are fully Cuban or fully Vietnamese). I further narrowed my dataset to only include respondents with national origins with at least 100 other respondents surveyed and with specifically coded responses to the database variable from which I constructed the "has co-ethnic friends" independent variable (only removing Jamaica from the national origins sampled). This brought the sample size to 3205, including immigrants with national

origins of Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Laos, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Vietnam. I used multiple imputation with my data to avoid biasing it by non-response values.

**Variables.** Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study, before running multiple imputation. Here are descriptions of the variables discussed.

***HL Preference.*** Heritage language preference is the dependent variable. Respondents open-endedly reported the language they preferred to speak most of the time. I coded those who responded with English a 0 and those who responded with a non-English language a 1. 31.3% of the studied participants reported they preferred speaking a non-English language most of the time, which I assumed to be their heritage language (HL). Unlike *HL ability*, *HL preference* implies a level of value of one language over another. One can have aptitude in a non-English language and still not see value in it. Many studies (Alba, 2002; Alba and Nee, 2003; Portes and Schauffler, 1994; Waters, et al., 2010) examine factors that affect language usage, but in doing so, look only at the ways in which immigrants possess language ability that is available to them growing up. Language preference exists on a plane that is about more than just what is available to them; language preference involves the framing of their in-group identities in a way that is expressed functionally and saliently in relation to dominant society.

Unlike many scholars (Shin, 2011; Stevens, 1992) who study language use in the home domain, I study ‘most of the time’ language preference so that I can understand general attitudes towards this ethnic marker (Fishman, 1972). I operationalize my heritage language variable by assuming that in answering the question, “What language do you prefer to speak most of the time,” they are not just thinking about what they speak at home or what will help them to get a job someday; they are eighth and ninth graders considering what language they prefer to speak with their friends at school, sometimes in the face of discrimination, having co-ethnic friends, and low socioeconomic prestige. By including the frequency in which a non-English language is

used at home as a control variable, I examine how immigrants make language preference decisions in response to individual judgments, rather than merely in response to the languages available to them.

***Context of Reception Variables.*** I selected three context of reception variables to focus on: combined parent socioeconomic index (SEI), having co-ethnic friends, and reported discrimination. These three variables were selected because of their previously described involvement with ELIT. Combined parent SEI was selected by taking the sum of mother SEI scores and father SEI scores, both of which measured parental occupational prestige. This variable serves as proxy for parental economic capital. I selected it because, unlike household income, it captures the overall prestige of someone's job, rather than just what is available to them. I constructed having co-ethnic friends as a variable by determining the national origin of the respondents, and then determining if they had close friends who were born in the same country as the respondents' parents. Reported discrimination was constructed as a response to the question, "Have you ever felt discriminated against?"

***Judgments about America's greatness.*** To operationalize judgments about immigrants' ideal EV, in comparison to that of dominant society, I study agreement with the statements, "The American way of life weakens the family" and "There is no better country to live in than the U.S." Both of these responses are judgments about the value of dominant society culture as compared to their own ethnolinguistic culture. I assume that individuals who judge America and its values negatively are more likely to judge their own *ideal* EV as significantly high, at least in comparison to American English's EV. Furthermore, I assume that immigrants' disagreement with "There is no better country to live in than the U.S." and agreement with "The American way of life weakens the family" aligns with the assessments of their in-group identity as subjectively high and worth being valued in comparison to that of dominant society. According

to ELIT, high expression of these judgments can increase motivation to express distinctive ethnic markers. Therefore, I expect to observe that immigrants expressing these resistant attitudes will more likely prefer speaking their heritage language (Liebkind, 2010).

**Data Analysis Procedure.** Using these operationalized variables to fit the different theorized components of ELIT, I test the previously described hypotheses to determine if I can find support for the theory amongst significantly large immigrants groups in the Miami/Ft. Lauderdale and San Diego areas.

*Understanding the Presented Regression Tables.* I test most of my hypotheses by comparing effect sizes between different regression models. I examine how variables' associations with HL preference strengthen or dampen upon controlling for the effects of the variables I hypothesize affect them. Tables 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9 take this approach to address different hypotheses. Each of these five tables presents a base logit model including national origin and control variables as independent variables (with Tables 5, 7, and 9 also including the agreement with America's greatness variable and two context of reception variables, and Table 4 including interactions effects between national origin and context of reception variables) and then progressively adds in variables. In each of the tables, I have bolded the variables I expected to change (or not change) according to my hypotheses. Note that when looking at Tables 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9, I am more interested in how effect sizes strengthen or dampen, rather than just in the effect size values themselves.

Tables 6 and 8 begin with a base model, including the effects of national origin, two context of reception variables, the variable for agreement with America's greatness, and the controls. The second and third models in these tables present the effects of the variables in the base model when the data is stratified by the context of reception variable in discussion. Presenting it in this way allows us to examine how the effect sizes on context of reception and

agreement with America's greatness on HL preference depend on the variable by which the data is stratified.

***Control Variables.*** Throughout my regression analyses, I control for parental arrival years, sex, age, time living in the U.S., having citizen status, being a 1.5 generation immigrant rather than a second generation immigrant, parental English knowledge, and the frequency in which non-English languages are used at home. To simplify my presentation of results, I hide the effects of these control variables in Tables 3 through 9. Tables including the effect sizes of these control variables are available by request.

***Hypothesis Testing.*** Before presenting my results, I will explain how I specifically test each hypothesis.

***Hypothesis 1.*** I hypothesize that second generation immigrant HL preference varies significantly depending on parental national origin. To test this, I examine a cross tabulation of national origin and HL preference (presented in Table 2). I also conduct a chi-squared test to test the null hypothesis that the variance in HL preference does not depend on national origin.

***Hypothesis 2.*** In hypothesis 2, I predict that the relationship between second-generation immigrant heritage language preference and parental national origin will be mediated by the context of reception variables I focus on in this study. To test this, I conduct chi-squared analyses, testing the null-hypotheses that HL preference does not vary depending on having co-ethnic friends and that it also does not vary depending on reporting being discriminated against. I also conduct a two-sample t-test testing the null-hypothesis that combined parent SEI values are not significantly different amongst immigrants who preferred English versus preferred their HL. I examine a cross tabulation (in Table 2) between these context of reception variables and HL preference to infer the directional associations between these variables. I examine Table 3, as previously described, to examine how the effect sizes of national origins change upon adding in

the model context of reception variables and the interaction between context of reception variables and national origin. Assuming that context of reception variables partially moderate the effect of national origin on HL preference, as I progressively add context of reception variables into the models, I expect to observe changes in the significance levels of the effect sizes of national origins on HL preference.

*Hypothesis 3.* When second generation immigrants judge their ethnolinguistic group's low EV as illegitimate – operationalized as disagreeing with the statement, “There is no better country to live in than the U.S.” and agreeing with the statement, “The American way of life weakens the family” – I hypothesize that they have an increased likelihood of preferring their HL over English. To test this, I conduct chi-squared analyses, testing the null-hypotheses that HL preference does not vary depending on agreement with these judgment factors. To infer the directional associations between these variables, I examine a cross tabulation (in Table 2) between these context of reception variables and HL preference. I examine Table 4, as previously described, to determine whether there is a significant association between agreement with these judgments and HL preference, even after controlling for the effects of national origin, context of reception, the interaction between national origin and context of reception, and the controls. I predict that strongly agreeing with (compared to strongly disagreeing with) the statement that the American way of life weakens family ties will have a significant positive effect on HL preference. I also predict that strongly agreeing with (compared to strongly disagreeing with) the statement that there is no better place to live than the United States will have a significant negative effect on HL preference.

*Hypothesis 4.* I hypothesize that having co-ethnic friends and having a high economic status can lead to heightened perceptions that a community possesses capital and a high enough EV to enable immigrants to respond by signaling their ethnic identity. If immigrants perceive



that they have enough capital to increase their EV, then they are more likely to feel that they can positively change their EV by signaling ethnic markers via HL preference, and are thus more likely to rate the value of their ethnolinguistic community as higher than that of dominant society. I operationalize this hypothesis in three ways: a) SEI will have a significant negative association with the judgment that America is great; b) having co-ethnic friends will have a significant negative association with the judgment that America is great; and c) SEI and having co-ethnic friends will significantly interact in influencing HL preference.

To address parts a and c of Hypothesis 4, I run an analysis of variance test examining the effect of parental SEI on the judgment that America is great and on having co-ethnic friends. I examine Models 3 and 4 of Table 5, which build off of the base model by adding in the SEI\*having co-ethnic friends interaction and the SEI\*“U.S. is the best” interaction. Further testing parts a and c, I expect to find that adding in these interactions will dampen the effect sizes of having co-ethnic friends and agreement with America’s greatness.

To address part b and to further examine part c, I examine the differences in effects sizes of agreement with America’s greatness and SEI, when stratified by being discriminated against (Table 6). According to my hypothesis, I expect there to be significant differences in effect sizes of these two variables depending on whether or not sampled individuals have co-ethnic friends. Furthermore, in Table 7, I expect to see that the effect sizes of SEI (in Model 2) and of agreement with America’s greatness (in Model 4) significantly dampen upon adding in these two variables’ interactions with having co-ethnic friends.

*Hypothesis 5.* I hypothesize that having high job prestige and not being discriminated against, both of which are a part of a positive context of reception, negatively moderate the effects of having agency, as covered by Hypothesis 4, on the chance that immigrants will judge their statuses as illegitimate, and therefore respond by expressing preference for their HL. I

operationalize this hypothesis in 4 ways: a) SEI will have a significant positive association with the judgment that America is great; b) being discriminated against will have a significant negative association with the judgment that America is great; c) SEI and being discriminated against will significantly interact in influencing HL preference; and d) being discriminated against and having co-ethnic friends will interact in influencing HL preference.

Part a of Hypothesis 5 is addressed by part a of Hypothesis 4; these hypotheses predict opposing interaction effects. To address part c of Hypothesis 5, I run an analysis of variance test examining the effect of parental SEI on being discriminated against. Further testing part c, I examine Model 2 of Table 5, which build off of the base model by adding in the SEI\*being discriminated against interaction. I expect to find that adding in this interaction will dampen the effect size of being discriminated against.

To address parts b and d and to further examine part c, from the other direction, I examine the differences in effect sizes of agreement with America's greatness, having co-ethnic friends, and SEI, when stratified by having reporting having been discriminated against (Table 8). According to my hypothesis, I expect there to be significant differences in effect sizes of these three variables depending on whether or not sampled individuals have been discriminated against. Furthermore, in Table 9, I expect to see that the effect sizes of SEI (in Model 2), having co-ethnic friends (in Model 3), and agreement with America's greatness (in Model 4) significantly dampen upon adding in these three variables' interactions with being discriminated against.

Finally, to address the reverse side of part d, I examine how the effect of being discriminated against differs depending on whether or not immigrants have co-ethnic friends (looking back at Table 6), and whether the effect size of being discriminated against dampens

significantly after controlling for the interaction between being discriminated against and having co-ethnic friends (look at Model 3 of Table 7).

## Results

**Testing Hypothesis 1.** There is an overall heritage language preference rate of 31.3% amongst the immigrants surveyed in Wave 1 of the CILS database, including children with two parents from Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Laos, Nicaragua, Philippines, and Vietnam. The national origin-specific HL preference rates can be observed in Table 2. Overall, the percentage of immigrants that preferred speaking their HL most of the time differed significantly by national origin,  $\chi^2(7, N = 3205) = 505.05, p < 0.001$ , supporting Hypothesis 1. According to Table 2, Mexico has the highest rate of HL preference (0.629); therefore, when running logit regressions with this data, Mexico was selected as the reference level. Supplementary Table S1 provides further detailed descriptive statistics by national origin.

**Testing Hypothesis 2.** The percentage of immigrants that preferred speaking their HL differed significantly by context of reception variables: having co-ethnic friends,  $\chi^2(1, N = 2844) = 7.27, p = 0.007$ ; reporting having been discriminated against,  $\chi^2(1, N = 3186) = 31.52, p < 0.001$ ; and combined parent socioeconomic index,  $t(823.16) = 10.34, p < 0.001$ . As seen in Table 2, respondents who have co-ethnic friends and who report having been discriminated against have significantly higher chances of preferring their heritage language. Additionally, parental SEI is negatively associated with HL preference; respondents who prefer English have significantly lower combined parental SEI scores. This evidence supports the hypothesized presence of a relationship between context of reception factors and HL preference.

In Model 1 of Table 3, all national origin levels have significantly negative effect sizes when compared to Mexico as a reference national origin. Progressively adding context of reception variables and the interactions between these variables and national origin to the base model either dampens or strengthens the effect sizes of national origin. Adding in the original context of reception variables, without the interaction between the variable and national origin,

changes the effect sizes, but only does so slightly; dampening and strengthening effects generally take place more significantly upon adding in the interactions between the context of reception variables and national origin. This suggests that context of reception likely has more of a moderating, rather than a mediating effect, on the relationship between national origin and HL preference. Despite this, there are still many significant effect sizes of national origin levels, compared to Mexico, that are statistically significant, even after controlling for the interactions between national origin and context of reception. This includes the effect sizes of Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Philippines.

**Testing Hypothesis 3.** Upon examining Table 2 and running chi-squared tests, we see that immigrants who prefer their heritage language express significantly *more* agreement with the idea that the American way of life weakens family ties,  $\chi^2(3, N = 3134) = 22.74, p < 0.001$ . Additionally, immigrants who prefer their heritage language express significantly *less* agreement with the idea that the United States is the best country,  $\chi^2(3, N = 3166) = 52.47, p < 0.001$ .

Table 4 shows that even after controlling for the effects of national origin, context of reception, the interaction between national origin and context of reception, and the controls, the effects of the studied judgment variables significantly influence HL preference. When each of the judgments are added to the base model individually in Models 2, they are significant, but when both of them are included in Model 4, the effect of agreeing with the first judgment variable becomes insignificant. For this reason, I conclude that I have enough evidence to accept Hypothesis 3. I choose to only examine agreement with the second judgment variable in later analyses as to avoid making the models too complicated.

**Testing Hypothesis 4.** The effect of parental SEI on having co-ethnic friends is not statistically significant,  $F(1) = 2.44, p = 0.118$ . On the other hand, parental SEI has a significant effect on agreement with the United States being the best country,  $F(3) = 8.14, p < 0.001$ .

Contrary to what I predicted with Hypothesis 4, immigrants with higher parental SEI scores are more likely to agree that the United States is the best. I find similar results when examining this interaction in Table 5.

In Table 5, upon adding in the effect of parental SEI, as well as the interaction between SEI and having co-ethnic friends, in Model 3, the originally significant positive effect size of having co-ethnic friends (0.473,  $p < 0.05$ ) dampens so that it is no longer significant (0.056,  $p > 0.10$ ). Similarly, upon adding in SEI and the interaction between SEI and agreement with the United States being the best, in Model 4, the originally significant negative effect size of the judgment variable (-0.528,  $p < 0.01$ ) dampens so that it is no longer significant (-0.222,  $p > 0.10$ ).

Tables 6 and 7 examine differences in effect sizes when controlling for variables' interaction with having co-ethnic friends. Table 6 reveals that the negative effect of agreeing with the United States being the best, and the positive effect of being discriminated against, are only significant when immigrants have co-ethnic friends. It reveals an inconclusive relationship between the dependency of SEI's effect size on having co-ethnic friends.

In Table 7, upon adding in the effect of having co-ethnic friends, as well as the interaction between having co-ethnic friends and parental SEI, in Model 2, the originally significant negative effect size of parental SEI (-0.006,  $p < 0.05$ ) dampens so that it is no longer significant (0.012,  $p > 0.10$ ). Similarly, upon adding in the effect of having co-ethnic friends, as well as the interaction between having co-ethnic friends and strongly agreeing that the United States is the best, in Model 4, the originally significant negative effect size of strongly agreeing that the United States is the best (-0.515,  $p < 0.01$ ) dampens so that it is no longer significant (-0.115,  $p > 0.10$ ).

**Testing Hypothesis 5.** The effect of parental SEI on being discriminated against is not statistically significant,  $F(1) = 2.68$ ,  $p = 0.102$ . Despite this, in Model 2 of Table 5, upon adding in the effect of parental SEI, as well as the interaction between SEI and being discriminated against, the originally significant positive effect size of being discriminated against (0.326,  $p < 0.01$ ) dampens so that it is no longer significant (0.124,  $p > 0.10$ ).

Tables 8 and 9 examine differences in effect size when controlling for variables' interaction with being discriminated against. Table 8 reveals that agreeing with the United States being the best does not depend on whether or not immigrants are discriminated against. On the other hand, the positive effect of having co-ethnic friends is only significant when immigrants are discriminated against. Also in Table 8, we see that the negative effect of parental SEI is significant when immigrants have not been discriminated against, but is not significant when they have been discriminated against.

In Table 9, upon adding in the effect of being discriminated against, as well as the interaction between having being discriminated against and parental SEI, in Model 2, the originally significant negative effect size of parental SEI ( $-0.005$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) increases ( $-0.008$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). Alternatively, upon adding in the effect of being discriminated against, as well as the interaction between being discriminated against and having co-ethnic friends, in Model 3, the originally significant positive effect size of having co-ethnic friends (0.477,  $p < 0.05$ ) dampens so that it is no longer significant (0.271,  $p > 0.10$ ). Finally, upon adding in the effect of being discriminated against, as well as the interaction between being discriminated against and agreeing that the United States is the best, in Model 4, the originally significant negative effect size of agreeing that the United States is the best ( $-0.547$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) only dampens slightly ( $-0.487$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ).

Looking back at Table 6, the positive effect of being discriminated against is only significant when immigrants have co-ethnic friends. In Model 3 of Table 7, upon adding in the effect of having co-ethnic friends, as well as the interaction between having co-ethnic friends and being discriminated against, the originally significant positive effect size of being discriminated against (0.344,  $p < 0.01$ ) dampens so that it is no longer significant (0.015,  $p > 0.10$ ).



## Discussion

Upon stepping back to observe the overall trends I described in detail in the previous section, I find support for ELIT as a possible explanation of the variation in HL preference amongst the 1.5 and second generation immigrants studied in this project. I find that I can accept hypotheses 1 and 2, which claim that variance in HL preference is influenced by national origin-specific context of reception factors. I also find possible support for hypothesis 3, which states that immigrants who judge their ethnolinguistic groups' culture as valuable in comparison to that of dominant society are more likely to signal their ethnic identity via HL preference. Finally, I find that hypotheses 4 and 5 are more complicated than I had originally predicted, but find strong support behind ELIT, as a whole, in influencing the way HL preference varies amongst immigrants.

**National Origin, Context of Reception, and HL Preference.** Overall, the percentage of immigrants studied in the CILS database who preferred speaking their heritage language most of the time varied significantly by national origin, having co-ethnic friends, reporting having been discriminated against, and combined parental socioeconomic status. Adding the interaction effects of context of reception and national origin to a logit regression model of HL preference explains much of the effect of national origin on HL preference. This suggests that national origin-dependent context of reception factors might, as hypothesized, influence HL preference. It is also important to notice, however, that despite adding in these controls, the individual effects of national origin are still significant for many national origins compared to Mexico. Considering this, it is likely that there are other factors, other than the three context of reception factors I examine as a part of ELIT theory, that explain why HL preference depends on national origin. I discuss these possibilities in my limitations section.

**Judgments about Dominant Society and EV.** Immigrants who preferred their HL expressed significantly more agreement with the judgment that the American way of life weakens family ties and expressed significantly less agreement with the judgment that the United States is the best country. When running these variables in a regression analysis on HL preference, their effect sizes remained statistically significant, despite controlling for the individual and interaction effects of national origin and context of reception variables. In my operationalization of Hypothesis 3, I assumed that those who agree that the American way of life weakens family ties and disagree that the United States is the greatest country are more likely to judge their ideal EV as high, in comparison to dominant society, and are thus more likely to express ethnic markers as described in ELIT. Considering that these judgment variables have significant effect sizes in influencing HL preference, with the directional effects I hypothesized would exist, I find support for Hypothesis 3.

It is important to note again some of the national origin effect sizes remain significant (including that of Nicaragua and the Philippines, relative to Mexico), suggesting that even upon controlling for the effect of judgment variables, there are still likely national origin-specific effects of national origin that I am not accounting for in my operationalization of ELIT. Also, one should consider that it is possible that other variables, separate from ELIT theory, may explain the observed relationship between these judgments and HL preference.

**Ethnic Agency, Judgments about EV, and HL Preference.** Hypothesis 4 addresses the side of ELIT in which immigrants judge their EVs as unstable and able to be changed, as mediated by their ethnic agency. This hypothesis is based on the idea that even if immigrants have the motivation to prioritize increasing their status, if they do not have at least a base level of capital, both social (via their having co-ethnic friends) and economic (via parents' SEI), then they will not prioritize emphasizing their ethnic identity via ELIT.

Considering this hypothesis, I expected to observe significant interaction effects of SEI and having co-ethnic friends on judgments about the United States being the best. Immigrants with higher SEI scores had significantly higher rates of agreement with the United States being the best. While this aligns with my expectations for Hypothesis 5, this does not confirm the part of Hypothesis 4 that assumed that there would be a conditional positive effect of SEI on agreement that the United States is the best.

The other context of reception factor, which does show a significant interaction effect with the agreement that the United States is the best, is having co-ethnic friends. The negative effect of agreement that the United States is the best is significant in negatively influencing HL preference when immigrants report having co-ethnic friends, but not when they do not have co-ethnic friends. In other words, this can be interpreted as: immigrants only judge their EV as illegitimate (represented by the negative effect size of agreement with the judgment variable on HL preference) whenever they have co-ethnic friends and thus have the ethnic agency to respond in such a way. Parental economic capital might not have as much of an effect as I had originally hypothesized, but having social capital appears to be important in moderating the effect of the judgment variable on HL preference via ethnic agency, as predicted by ELIT.

**HL Preference and the Motivation to Improve EV.** Hypothesis 5 addresses the side of ELIT that discusses the factors that increase the likelihood that immigrants will judge their EV as illegitimate. It involves immigrants recognizing their status and having the motivation to signal and increase their ethnolinguistic vitality. I hypothesize that lower status, which I operationalize as reporting being discriminated against and having less parental economic capital (via combined parental SEI scores), leads immigrants to have increased motivation to judge the dominant society's culture's value as less than that of their own community. Considering this, I expected to

observe significant relationships between agreeing that the United States is the best, being discriminated against, and SEI score.

I noticed that as hypothesized, and as previously described, immigrants with higher SEI scores reported significantly higher agreement that the United States is the best. This is consistent with one of the sides of ELIT, in which having a low SEI increases awareness of one's lower EV and therefore makes immigrants more likely to judge their status as illegitimate. Interestingly, the other factor I hypothesized would significantly regulate the effect of judging one's status as illegitimate – being discriminated against – did not have a significant interaction effect.

While discrimination did not directly affect the effect size of agreement that the United States is the best on HL preference, it did impact the effect of SEI on HL preference, which is interesting, considering that both of these were hypothesized to influence the likelihood immigrants would judge their low EV as illegitimate. When immigrants reported being discriminated against, there was not a significant effect of SEI on HL preference, yet when they were not discriminated against, there was a significant negative effect of SEI on HL preference. In other words, it is possible that discrimination carries the main effect in determining how immigrants will judge “illegitimacy,” but that when discrimination is absent, having a low SEI can “pick up the slack” of this absence of discrimination and signal to immigrants that there is something worth pushing against to preserve their EV. This suggests that SEI might indeed be important in regulating the likelihood that immigrants will judge their low EV as illegitimate, but that this only has such an effect when immigrants report not being discriminated against.

**The Interaction between Ethnic Agency and Motivation to Improve EV.** While being discriminated against did not regulate the effect of agreement with the United States being the best on HL preference, it did regulate the effect of having co-ethnic friends on HL

preference. The effect of having co-ethnic friends on HL preference was positively significant when immigrants were discriminated against, but not when they were not discriminated against. The inverse was true, as well; the effect of being discriminated against was positively significant when immigrants had co-ethnic friends, but not when they did not have co-ethnic friends. This interesting interaction between discrimination and the effect of having co-ethnic friends mirrors the hypothesized effects of having ethnic agency and motivation to judge one's EV as illegitimate. Having co-ethnic friends, and the ethnic agency that results from this, is only significant in influencing HL preference when immigrants are discriminated against and thus have the motivation to judge their EV as illegitimate.

While my operationalizations of hypotheses 4 and 5 were not always significant in the ways I expected them to be, the results support the overall theory behind these hypotheses. ELIT is a significant possible explanation of the variation in HL preference amongst immigrants included in this analysis. I provide significant support for the possibility that immigrants weigh the social value of their ethnolinguistic community, and make decisions as to whether or not they will attempt to improve their community's value by signaling HL preference, depending on them having the following two factors: 1) having sufficient motivation to improve their status, and 2) having the agency to do so.

### **Overlooked Complexity**

This study is unique because it does not focus on the typical modes of incorporation that influence immigrants' assimilation into society. Rather than focusing on the ways in which immigrants weigh the economic costs and benefits of expressing certain ethnic markers, I focus on how immigrants construct certain individual-level judgments about their ethnolinguistic vitality. I aim to understand the ways in which individuals judge their EV's illegitimacy and instability within dominant society, as influenced by context of reception factors. The goal of this

paper is to present ELIT as a possible explanation of the decision making that immigrants undergo when deciding to selectively acculturate. Considering this, here are a few factors that could influence HL preference in a way I did not control for. These are factors that need to be included in future studies of ELIT to further defend the theory:

**Longitudinal Effects.** One important limitation of this study to consider regards the notion of causality. While ELIT explains theoretically how being discriminated against can *cause* immigrants to signal ethnic markers, the regression analyses I conducted do not permit such conclusions to be made. In fact, it is possible that conducting this study longitudinally could have revealed that HL preference influences discrimination, SEI, and having co-ethnic friends, rather than the other way around. I would need to examine how attitudes change and strengthen over time, with changes in the other variables, to get at the idea of causality.

**Immigrant replenishment.** Immigrant replenishment also could have influenced the results. Immigrant replenishment results in more *intergroup boundaries*, in which Mexican Americans distinguish themselves from non-Mexican Americans via a) experiences of “anti-immigrant antipathy” and b) increased saliency of race in their daily lives as they pertain to identifying as Mexican American. It also results in more *intragroup boundaries*, in which newly arrived Mexican immigrants define Mexican authenticity, creating the boundaries in which native-born Mexican Americans are judged to be either in or out of (Jiménez 2008, p. 1530). Other scholars have found that immigrant replenishment is strongly tied to intermarriage and the odds of speaking Spanish at home (Sosa, 2018). This can be explained in part by the fact that “new immigrants may bring more up-to-date versions of the sending society’s culture to ethnic communities” (Foner and Kasinitz, 2007, p. 271). Cubans, for example, are reportedly very conscious of the historical differences between themselves and the “exile generation,” as they tend to have lower rates of replenishment (Foner and Kasinitz, 2007). Mexicans, on the other

hand, have much higher replenishment rates, increasing their likelihood of speaking their HL at home and possibly increasing their ethnolinguistic identity's salience (Sosa, 2018).

**Race and Pan-Ethnicity.** Another limitation to my study is that I focused on immigrants who reported having two parents from the same country. I focused on the effect of national origins, when I could have focused on pan-ethnic identities, such as Hispanic or Asian, which could have influenced HL preference differently, as well as the definition of the “co-ethnic friends” variable. It is possible that immigrants with different national origins “assimilate” into different racial categories. For example, immigrants from Cambodia and Vietnam, despite speaking different languages, are racialized into the pan-ethnic “Asian American” racial category, in which English is a *lingua franca*. Immigrants from Cuba and Mexico, on the other hand, who come from Spanish speaking countries, are racialized into the pan-ethnic “Hispanic” racial category, and are more easily able to maintain bilingualism in both Spanish and English (Mouw and Xie, 1999)

**Allowing for equal preference for both HL and English.** The final limitation of this study is that the first wave of CILS did not allow respondents to say that they preferred speaking their HL and English equally. If this had been an option, it is possible that the results would have been different. This would have allowed for the possibility of biculturalism. In spite of this, however, it is still interesting that variation in preference differs so significantly depending on national origin, even without having the option to report equal preference for both.

## **Conclusions and Future Directions**

More research needs to be done examining the ways in which immigrants construct their ethnic identities via language preference. HL preference is not just a function of signaling one's identity according to what makes the most sense, economically; it is a function of ethnic agency that is constrained by social capital, as well as the status individuals perceive is ascribed to their

ethnolinguistic group. The perception of ethnic agency, and factors influencing the saliency of their lower status that influence language preference, influence how immigrants construct judgments about their ideal EV.

It is likely that economic factors and institutional effects explain part of the variation in HL preference, as is described in segmented assimilation theory, but it is very likely that ethnolinguistic identity theory is significant as well. Moving forward, researchers need to control for both economic decision-making factors and ELIT factors, as to understand how these factors work together, work in opposition, or interact in complex ways. Also, sociologists need to ask more questions about perceived in-group status, as it relates to the concept of ethnolinguistic vitality, the ability of an ethnolinguistic community to survive as a distinct collective entity amongst other ethnolinguistic communities. This study suggests that a strong relationship between ideal EV and context of reception exists.

By studying ethnolinguistic identity theory (ELIT), I am not arguing that immigrants do not weigh the costs and benefits of selective acculturation. I am arguing, however, that by focusing only on selective acculturation and segmented assimilation into society, researchers are overlooking the non-economic, individual-level ethnic meaning that immigrants construct in response to specific combinations of context of reception factors. Especially since this dataset's initial collection, immigration has become increasingly politicized. Public discourse on immigration is likely to continue to increase in complexity as the United States' immigration concentration increases. With this, it becomes even more important that education scholars and policy makers understand the complex ethnic identity construction that children of immigrants undergo (Cervantes-Soon, 2014). By not moving towards studying ethnic identity construction in a way that goes on beyond segmented assimilation, sociologists and education scholars will



continue to miss the rich ethnic decision making that immigrants undergo during their incorporation into American society.

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## Tables

**Table 1. Description of Variables Used in the Analysis**

Variable	Description	Mean	SD
Prefers heritage language	Reporting a non-English language when asked, "What language do you prefer to speak most of the time?"	.313	
Combined parent SEI	The sum of the mothers' and fathers' socioeconomic index scores	69.711	29.016
Has co-ethnic friends	Reported having close friends whose parents who were born in the same country as the respondents' parents	0.931	
Reported discrimination	Reported having been discriminated against	0.550	
Judgment about American Life	Response to: "The American way of life weakens the family."		
	Agree a lot	0.125	
	Agree a little	0.328	
	Disagree a little	0.362	
	Disagree a lot*	0.185	
Judgment about the U.S. as best	Response to: "There is no better country to live in than the U.S."		
	Agree a lot	0.328	
	Agree a little	0.282	
	Disagree a little	0.235	
	Disagree a lot*	0.155	
Control Variables:			
Father arrival year	Approximate year respondent's father came to the U.S.	77.101	8.534
Mother arrival year	Approximate year respondent's mother came to the U.S.	77.784	8.375
Sex	Sex (1=Male, 0=Female)	0.507	
Age	Age	14.246	0.869
Has citizenship status	Respondent is a U.S. citizen	0.652	
Is 1.5 generation	Respondent is a foreign-born 1.5 generation immigrant, rather than a native-born second generation immigrant	0.438	
Time Lived in the U.S.	Time living in the U.S.		
	Whole life	0.409	
	Five to nine years	0.222	
	Ten or more years	0.288	
	Less than five*	0.081	
Metropolitan area	Metropolitan area respondent lives in		
	Miami/Ft. Lauderdale*	0.478	
	San Diego	0.522	
Parent English knowledge	Indexed score denoting how well a parent can speak and write English	2.714	0.943
Home non-English frequency	Frequency in which a non-English language is spoken at home		
	Always	0.567	
	From time to time or never	0.403	
	Seldom or never*	0.029	

*Note:* For dummy variables, only the sample mean is given

\* Set as the reference value in logit regressions

**Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables used in analysis stratified by language preference: 1.5 and second generation immigrant children from CILS Wave 1 with two parents from Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Laos, Nicaragua, Philippines, and Vietnam.**

	Prefer English	Prefer HL			
	Proportion	Proportion	N		
National Origin					
Mexico	0.372	0.629	551		
Colombia	0.667	0.333	144		
Cuba	0.82	0.180	934		
Haiti	0.814	0.186	140		
Laos	0.545	0.455	191		
Nicaragua	0.734	0.266	293		
Philippines	0.862	0.138	625		
Vietnam	0.502	0.498	327		
Has co-ethnic friends					
False	0.783	0.217	198		
True	0.692	0.308	2646		
Reported discrimination					
False	0.739	0.261	1431		
True	0.647	0.353	1755		
Judgment about American Life					
Agree a lot	0.617	0.383	392		
Agree a little	0.660	0.340	1028		
Disagree a little	0.724	0.276	1136		
Disagree a lot	0.721	0.279	578		
Judgment about the U.S. as best					
Agree a lot	0.768	0.232	1039		
Agree a little	0.679	0.321	897		
Disagree a little	0.633	0.367	743		
Disagree a lot	0.620	0.380	487		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	N
Combined parent SEI	72.920	29.058	59.669	25.830	1726

*Note:* For dummy variables, only the sample mean is given



**Table 3: Logistic regression modeling the effect sizes of national origin and controls on heritage language preference. As models progress, context of reception variables and their interactions with national origin are added in.**

	Model 1: Base	Model 2: + SEI	Model 3: + SEI Interactions	Model 4: + Discrim.	Model 5: +Discrim.. Interactions	Model 6: +Co-Ethnic Friends	Model 7: +Co-Ethnic Friends Interactions
<b>National Origin</b>							
<b>Colombia</b>	-0.773* (0.448)	-0.715 (0.448)	-0.943 (0.762)	-0.983 (0.767)	-0.981 (0.806)	-0.934 (0.806)	-1.147 (1.038)
<b>Cuba</b>	-1.181*** (0.425)	-1.137*** (0.425)	-1.519*** (0.582)	-1.479** (0.583)	-1.567*** (0.593)	-1.605*** (0.594)	-1.530* (0.908)
<b>Haiti</b>	-1.367*** (0.471)	-1.390*** (0.472)	-2.102*** (0.772)	-2.149*** (0.776)	-2.167*** (0.830)	-2.200*** (0.836)	-2.413 (1.472)
<b>Laos</b>	-1.043*** (0.195)	-0.968*** (0.198)	-0.800 (0.536)	-0.826 (0.534)	-0.457 (0.601)	-0.453 (0.601)	-1.149 (0.990)
<b>Nicaragua</b>	-1.313*** (0.437)	-1.263*** (0.438)	-1.614** (0.632)	-1.642*** (0.634)	-1.686** (0.656)	-1.647** (0.657)	-1.792** (0.898)
<b>Philippines</b>	-2.353*** (0.192)	-2.293*** (0.193)	-2.129*** (0.523)	-2.161*** (0.525)	-1.774*** (0.559)	-1.780*** (0.559)	-2.303* (1.319)
<b>Vietnam</b>	-0.881*** (0.161)	-0.796*** (0.165)	-0.615 (0.451)	-0.643 (0.454)	-0.368 (0.497)	-0.359 (0.500)	0.209 (0.795)
Combined Parent SEI		-0.006** (0.002)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Colombia*Combined Parent SEI			0.003 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	0.005 (0.010)
Cuba*Combined Parent SEI			0.006 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)
Haiti*Combined Parent SEI			0.012 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)
Laos*Combined Parent SEI			-0.003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)
Nicaragua*Combined Parent SEI			0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)
Philippines*Combined Parent SEI			-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)
Vietnam*Combined Parent SEI			-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)
Reported Discrimination				0.365*** (0.093)	0.457** (0.199)	0.447** (0.199)	0.447** (0.200)
Colombia*Reported Discrimination					-0.035 (0.422)	-0.082 (0.423)	-0.111 (0.428)
Cuba*Reported Discrimination					0.262 (0.267)	0.280 (0.268)	0.279 (0.269)
Haiti*Reported Discrimination					0.007 (0.542)	0.005 (0.543)	0.002 (0.545)
Laos*Reported Discrimination					-0.564 (0.400)	-0.554 (0.401)	-0.562 (0.406)
Nicaragua*Reported Discrimination					0.058 (0.344)	0.056 (0.345)	0.053 (0.347)
Philippines*Reported Discrimination					-0.599* (0.325)	-0.598* (0.325)	-0.605* (0.326)
Vietnam*Reported Discrimination					-0.425 (0.330)	-0.413 (0.331)	-0.414 (0.331)

Has Co-Ethnic Friends						0.455**	0.435
						(0.193)	(0.537)
Colombia*Has Co-Ethnic Friends							0.272
							(0.755)
Cuba*Has Co-Ethnic Friends							-0.068
							(0.728)
Haiti*Has Co-Ethnic Friends							0.221
							(1.249)
Laos*Has Co-Ethnic Friends							0.754
							(0.858)
Nicaragua*Has Co-Ethnic Friends							0.176
							(0.689)
Philippines*Has Co-Ethnic Friends							0.543
							(1.215)
Vietnam*Has Co-Ethnic Friends							-0.618
							(0.661)
Constant	-3.952***	-3.396**	-3.402**	-3.694**	-3.740**	-4.182***	-4.169**
	(1.528)	(1.543)	(1.583)	(1.591)	(1.596)	(1.615)	(1.676)
Observations	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227

*Note:* Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S1 for the table with visible control effects.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 4: Logistic regression modeling the effect sizes of national origin, controls, context of reception variables, and the interactions between context of reception variables and national origin, on HL preference. With progressing models, ELIT variables said to effect HL preference are added in.**

	Model 1: Base	Model 2: + “American Way of Life Weakens the Family”	Model 3: + “There is No Better Country to Live in than the U.S.”	Model 4: +Both
<b>Agreement with the American Way of Life Weakening Family Ties</b>				
<b>Disagrees a little</b>		<b>-0.040</b>		<b>-0.084</b>
		<b>(0.134)</b>		<b>(0.136)</b>
<b>Agrees a little</b>		<b>0.165</b>		<b>0.116</b>
		<b>(0.135)</b>		<b>(0.137)</b>
<b>Agrees a lot</b>		<b>0.333**</b>		<b>0.268</b>
		<b>(0.164)</b>		<b>(0.166)</b>
<b>Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best</b>				
<b>Disagrees a little</b>			<b>-0.008</b>	<b>0.005</b>
			<b>(0.142)</b>	<b>(0.143)</b>
<b>Agrees a little</b>			<b>-0.157</b>	<b>-0.147</b>
			<b>(0.140)</b>	<b>(0.141)</b>
<b>Agrees a lot</b>			<b>-0.523***</b>	<b>-0.503***</b>
			<b>(0.141)</b>	<b>(0.142)</b>
<b>National Origin</b>				
Colombia	-1.147	-1.146	-1.126	-1.127
	(1.038)	(1.041)	(1.041)	(1.044)
Cuba	-1.530*	-1.551*	-1.455	-1.483
	(0.908)	(0.914)	(0.913)	(0.919)
Haiti	-2.413	-2.414*	-2.396	-2.394
	(1.472)	(1.467)	(1.481)	(1.476)
Laos	-1.149	-1.215	-1.203	-1.265
	(0.990)	(0.998)	(1.001)	(1.008)
Nicaragua	-1.792**	-1.774**	-1.651*	-1.645*
	(0.898)	(0.902)	(0.905)	(0.909)
Philippines	-2.303*	-2.290*	-2.319*	-2.301*
	(1.319)	(1.325)	(1.329)	(1.334)
Vietnam	0.209	0.199	0.288	0.276
	(0.795)	(0.798)	(0.799)	(0.802)
Combined Parent SEI	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Reported Discrimination	0.447**	0.426**	0.475**	0.454**
	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.201)	(0.202)
Has Co-Ethnic Friends	0.435	0.445	0.410	0.420
	(0.537)	(0.537)	(0.540)	(0.540)
Colombia*Combined Parent SEI	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Cuba*Combined Parent SEI	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Haiti*Combined Parent SEI	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Laos*Combined Parent SEI	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Nicaragua*Combined Parent SEI	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)

Philippines*Combined Parent SEI	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)
Vietnam*Combined Parent SEI	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)
Colombia*Reported Discrimination	-0.111 (0.428)	-0.161 (0.429)	-0.160 (0.430)	-0.197 (0.431)
Cuba*Reported Discrimination	0.279 (0.269)	0.271 (0.269)	0.227 (0.270)	0.222 (0.271)
Haiti*Reported Discrimination	0.002 (0.545)	0.032 (0.546)	-0.090 (0.548)	-0.061 (0.548)
Laos*Reported Discrimination	-0.562 (0.406)	-0.565 (0.408)	-0.614 (0.409)	-0.615 (0.411)
Nicaragua*Reported Discrimination	0.053 (0.347)	0.043 (0.348)	-0.039 (0.349)	-0.044 (0.350)
Philippines*Reported Discrimination	-0.605* (0.326)	-0.623* (0.327)	-0.650** (0.328)	-0.660** (0.329)
Vietnam*Reported Discrimination	-0.414 (0.331)	-0.455 (0.331)	-0.518 (0.333)	-0.552* (0.334)
Colombia*Has Co-Ethnic Friends	0.272 (0.755)	0.297 (0.755)	0.315 (0.758)	0.339 (0.759)
Cuba*Has Co-Ethnic Friends	-0.068 (0.728)	-0.031 (0.731)	-0.043 (0.733)	-0.007 (0.735)
Haiti*Has Co-Ethnic Friends	0.221 (1.249)	0.274 (1.249)	0.213 (1.257)	0.266 (1.255)
Laos*Has Co-Ethnic Friends	0.754 (0.858)	0.798 (0.862)	0.891 (0.861)	0.931 (0.866)
Nicaragua*Has Co-Ethnic Friends	0.176 (0.689)	0.157 (0.691)	0.149 (0.692)	0.138 (0.694)
Philippines*Has Co-Ethnic Friends	0.543 (1.215)	0.558 (1.221)	0.642 (1.225)	0.643 (1.231)
Vietnam*Has Co-Ethnic Friends	-0.618 (0.661)	-0.623 (0.664)	-0.574 (0.665)	-0.579 (0.668)
Constant	-4.169** (1.676)	-4.000** (1.682)	-4.068** (1.683)	-3.889** (1.689)
Observations	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227

*Note:* Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S2 for the table with visible control effects.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 5: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of reception variables, and judgment variables on HL preference. Models progress by adding in interactions between parental SEI and other context of reception and judgment variables.**

	Model 1: Base	Model 2: SEI * Discrimination Interaction	Model 3: SEI * Co-Ethnic Friends Interaction	Model 4: SEI * “U.S. is the Best”	Model 5: All SEI Interactions
<b>National Origin</b>					
Colombia	-0.730 (0.455)	-0.677 (0.455)	-0.674 (0.456)	-0.680 (0.456)	-0.678 (0.456)
Cuba	-1.098** (0.432)	-1.065** (0.432)	-1.061** (0.434)	-1.064** (0.434)	-1.074** (0.434)
Haiti	-1.501*** (0.478)	-1.533*** (0.478)	-1.524*** (0.480)	-1.527*** (0.479)	-1.536*** (0.479)
Laos	-0.985*** (0.198)	-0.914*** (0.201)	-0.917*** (0.201)	-0.912*** (0.202)	-0.913*** (0.202)
Nicaragua	-1.288*** (0.444)	-1.249*** (0.445)	-1.244*** (0.447)	-1.252*** (0.446)	-1.261*** (0.446)
Philippines	-2.376*** (0.195)	-2.320*** (0.195)	-2.322*** (0.196)	-2.314*** (0.196)	-2.323*** (0.196)
Vietnam	-0.814*** (0.164)	-0.734*** (0.167)	-0.735*** (0.167)	-0.728*** (0.168)	-0.730*** (0.168)
Combined Parent SEI		-0.008** (0.003)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.009)
<b>Reported Discrimination</b>	<b>0.326*** (0.093)</b>	<b>0.124 (0.248)</b>	<b>0.338*** (0.093)</b>	<b>0.335*** (0.094)</b>	<b>0.124 (0.248)</b>
<b>Has Co-Ethnic Friends</b>	<b>0.473** (0.192)</b>	<b>0.462** (0.193)</b>	<b>0.056 (0.520)</b>	<b>0.459** (0.193)</b>	<b>0.070 (0.523)</b>
<b>Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best</b>					
<b>Disagrees a little</b>	<b>-0.021 (0.141)</b>	<b>-0.014 (0.141)</b>	<b>-0.015 (0.141)</b>	<b>0.367 (0.378)</b>	<b>0.352 (0.379)</b>
<b>Agrees a little</b>	<b>-0.160 (0.139)</b>	<b>-0.156 (0.139)</b>	<b>-0.155 (0.139)</b>	<b>0.207 (0.364)</b>	<b>0.204 (0.365)</b>
<b>Agrees a lot</b>	<b>-0.528*** (0.140)</b>	<b>-0.510*** (0.140)</b>	<b>-0.514*** (0.140)</b>	<b>-0.222 (0.370)</b>	<b>-0.231 (0.370)</b>
Combined Parent SEI*Reported Discrimination		0.004 (0.004)			0.003 (0.004)
Combined Parent SEI*Has Co-Ethnic Friends			0.007 (0.008)		0.006 (0.008)
Combined Parent SEI*Disagrees a little				-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
Combined Parent SEI*Agrees a little				-0.006 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
Combined Parent SEI*Agrees a lot				-0.005 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)
Constant	-4.576*** (1.567)	-3.846** (1.600)	-3.669** (1.646)	-4.321*** (1.602)	-3.776** (1.692)
Observations	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227

Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S3 for the table with visible control effects.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 6: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of reception variables, and judgment variables on HL preference. Contrasts the effects when immigrants do and do not have co-ethnic friends.**

	Model 1: Base	Model 2: Does Not Have Co-Ethnic Friends	Model 3: Has Co-Ethnic Friends
<b>National Origin</b>			
Colombia	-0.718 (0.453)	0.543 (1,104.107)	-0.652 (0.525)
Cuba	-1.022** (0.431)	0.677 (1,104.108)	-1.090** (0.499)
Haiti	-1.506*** (0.477)	-0.437 (1,104.108)	-1.543*** (0.539)
Laos	-0.942*** (0.200)	-2.929*** (1.119)	-0.781*** (0.213)
Nicaragua	-1.269*** (0.443)	-0.194 (1,104.108)	-1.233** (0.513)
Philippines	-2.305*** (0.195)	-3.540* (1.854)	-2.321*** (0.201)
Vietnam	-0.764*** (0.167)	-0.883 (0.887)	-0.765*** (0.177)
<b>Combined Parent SEI</b>	<b>-0.006** (0.002)</b>	<b>-0.009 (0.010)</b>	<b>-0.005** (0.002)</b>
<b>Reported Discrimination</b>	<b>0.344*** (0.093)</b>	<b>0.030 (0.448)</b>	<b>0.362*** (0.098)</b>
<b>Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best</b>			
Disagrees a little	-0.025 (0.141)	-0.159 (0.629)	-0.005 (0.148)
Agrees a little	-0.156 (0.139)	-0.361 (0.706)	-0.131 (0.146)
Agrees a lot	-0.515*** (0.140)	-0.048 (0.635)	-0.545*** (0.147)
Constant	-3.573** (1.559)	-24.469 (1,467.254)	-3.365** (1.618)
Observations	3,227	256	2,971

*Note:* Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S6 for the table with visible control effects.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 7: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of reception variables, and judgment variables on HL preference. Models progress by adding in interactions between having co-ethnic friends and other context of reception and judgment variables.**

	Model 1: Base	Model 2: Co-Ethnic Friends * SEI Interaction	Model 3: Co-Ethnic Friends * Discrimination Interaction	Model 4: Co-Ethnic Friends * “U.S. is the Best”	Model 5: All Co-Ethnic Friends Interactions
National Origin					
Colombia	-0.718 (0.453)	-0.674 (0.456)	-0.683 (0.456)	-0.672 (0.458)	-0.673 (0.459)
Cuba	-1.022** (0.431)	-1.061** (0.434)	-1.046** (0.434)	-1.057** (0.435)	-1.050** (0.437)
Haiti	-1.506*** (0.477)	-1.524*** (0.480)	-1.518*** (0.479)	-1.524*** (0.480)	-1.519*** (0.482)
Laos	-0.942*** (0.200)	-0.917*** (0.201)	-0.912*** (0.201)	-0.901*** (0.201)	-0.900*** (0.202)
Nicaragua	-1.269*** (0.443)	-1.244*** (0.447)	-1.236*** (0.446)	-1.254*** (0.448)	-1.251*** (0.449)
Philippines	-2.305*** (0.195)	-2.322*** (0.196)	-2.317*** (0.195)	-2.318*** (0.195)	-2.324*** (0.196)
Vietnam	-0.764*** (0.167)	-0.735*** (0.167)	-0.729*** (0.168)	-0.730*** (0.168)	-0.727*** (0.168)
	(0.409)	(0.410)	(0.410)	(0.410)	(0.410)
Has Co-Ethnic Friends		0.056 (0.520)	0.271 (0.278)	0.466 (0.442)	-0.132 (0.688)
<b>Combined Parent SEI</b>	<b>-0.006**</b> <b>(0.002)</b>	<b>-0.012</b> <b>(0.008)</b>	<b>-0.005**</b> <b>(0.002)</b>	<b>-0.005**</b> <b>(0.002)</b>	<b>-0.012</b> <b>(0.008)</b>
<b>Reported Discrimination</b>	<b>0.344***</b> <b>(0.093)</b>	<b>0.338***</b> <b>(0.093)</b>	<b>0.015</b> <b>(0.357)</b>	<b>0.338***</b> <b>(0.094)</b>	<b>0.051</b> <b>(0.363)</b>
<b>Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best</b>					
<b>Disagrees a little</b>	<b>-0.025</b> <b>(0.141)</b>	<b>-0.015</b> <b>(0.141)</b>	<b>-0.019</b> <b>(0.141)</b>	<b>-0.162</b> <b>(0.536)</b>	<b>-0.156</b> <b>(0.545)</b>
<b>Agrees a little</b>	<b>-0.156</b> <b>(0.139)</b>	<b>-0.155</b> <b>(0.139)</b>	<b>-0.158</b> <b>(0.139)</b>	<b>-0.471</b> <b>(0.574)</b>	<b>-0.474</b> <b>(0.579)</b>
<b>Agrees a lot</b>	<b>-0.515***</b> <b>(0.140)</b>	<b>-0.514***</b> <b>(0.140)</b>	<b>-0.517***</b> <b>(0.140)</b>	<b>-0.115</b> <b>(0.524)</b>	<b>-0.124</b> <b>(0.532)</b>
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Combined Parent SEI		0.007 (0.008)			0.007 (0.008)
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Reported Discrimination			0.349 (0.373)		0.311 (0.380)
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Disagrees a little				0.157 (0.562)	0.151 (0.571)
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Agrees a little				0.334 (0.599)	0.337 (0.604)
Has Co-Ethnic Friends*Agrees a lot				-0.434 (0.552)	-0.425 (0.560)
Constant	-3.573** (1.559)	-3.669** (1.646)	-3.853** (1.587)	-4.038** (1.614)	-3.495** (1.684)
Observations	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227

Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S7 for the table with visible control effects.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 8: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of reception variables, and judgment variables on HL preference. Contrasts the effects when immigrants are not discriminated against, versus when they are not.**

	Model 1: Base	Model 2: Reports Not Being Discriminated Against	Model 3: Reports Being Discriminated Against
<b>National Origin</b>			
Colombia	-0.681 (0.455)	0.860 (0.856)	-1.562** (0.615)
Cuba	-1.086** (0.434)	0.407 (0.840)	-1.802*** (0.585)
Haiti	-1.465*** (0.479)	-0.049 (0.925)	-2.404*** (0.632)
Laos	-0.881*** (0.200)	-0.621* (0.351)	-1.039*** (0.251)
Nicaragua	-1.208*** (0.446)	0.180 (0.853)	-2.053*** (0.598)
Philippines	-2.288*** (0.194)	-1.879*** (0.309)	-2.617*** (0.251)
Vietnam	-0.705*** (0.167)	-0.475 (0.292)	-0.879*** (0.210)
<b>Combined Parent SEI</b>	<b>-0.005** (0.002)</b>	<b>-0.007* (0.004)</b>	<b>-0.004 (0.003)</b>
<b>Has Co-Ethnic Friends</b>	<b>0.477** (0.192)</b>	<b>0.257 (0.285)</b>	<b>0.630** (0.262)</b>
<b>Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best</b>			
<b>Disagrees a little</b>	<b>-0.036 (0.141)</b>	<b>-0.169 (0.231)</b>	<b>0.071 (0.181)</b>
<b>Agrees a little</b>	<b>-0.177 (0.139)</b>	<b>-0.136 (0.226)</b>	<b>-0.196 (0.179)</b>
<b>Agrees a lot</b>	<b>-0.547*** (0.139)</b>	<b>-0.527** (0.226)</b>	<b>-0.535*** (0.183)</b>
Constant	-3.742** (1.574)	-4.584* (2.412)	-3.591* (2.112)
Observations	3,227	1,450	1,777

*Note:* Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S4 for the table with visible control effects.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



**Table 9: Logistic regression modeling the effect of national origin, context of reception variables, and judgment variables on HL preference. Models progress by adding in interactions between being discriminated against and other context of reception and judgment variables.**

	Model 1: Base	Model 2: Discrimination * SEI Interaction	Model 3: Discrimination * Co-Ethnic Friends Interaction	Model 4: Discrimination * "U.S. is the Best"	Model 5: All Discrimination Interactions
<b>National Origin</b>					
Colombia	-0.681 (0.455)	-0.677 (0.455)	-0.683 (0.456)	-0.674 (0.457)	-0.682 (0.456)
Cuba	-1.086** (0.434)	-1.065** (0.432)	-1.046** (0.434)	-1.058** (0.434)	-1.055** (0.434)
Haiti	-1.465*** (0.479)	-1.533*** (0.478)	-1.518*** (0.479)	-1.536*** (0.480)	-1.541*** (0.480)
Laos	-0.881*** (0.200)	-0.914*** (0.201)	-0.912*** (0.201)	-0.926*** (0.201)	-0.922*** (0.201)
Nicaragua	-1.208*** (0.446)	-1.249*** (0.445)	-1.236*** (0.446)	-1.249*** (0.446)	-1.252*** (0.446)
Philippines	-2.288*** (0.194)	-2.320*** (0.195)	-2.317*** (0.195)	-2.323*** (0.196)	-2.327*** (0.196)
Vietnam	-0.705*** (0.167)	-0.734*** (0.167)	-0.729*** (0.168)	-0.739*** (0.168)	-0.734*** (0.168)
<b>Reported Discrimination</b>		0.124 (0.248)	0.015 (0.357)	0.368* (0.224)	-0.187 (0.469)
<b>Combined Parent SEI</b>	<b>-0.005**</b> <b>(0.002)</b>	<b>-0.008**</b> <b>(0.003)</b>	<b>-0.005**</b> <b>(0.002)</b>	<b>-0.005**</b> <b>(0.002)</b>	<b>-0.008**</b> <b>(0.003)</b>
<b>Has Co-Ethnic Friends</b>	<b>0.477**</b> <b>(0.192)</b>	<b>0.462**</b> <b>(0.193)</b>	<b>0.271</b> <b>(0.278)</b>	<b>0.460**</b> <b>(0.193)</b>	<b>0.257</b> <b>(0.279)</b>
<b>Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best</b>					
<b>Disagrees a little</b>	<b>-0.036</b> <b>(0.141)</b>	<b>-0.014</b> <b>(0.141)</b>	<b>-0.019</b> <b>(0.141)</b>	<b>-0.108</b> <b>(0.228)</b>	<b>-0.106</b> <b>(0.229)</b>
<b>Agrees a little</b>	<b>-0.177</b> <b>(0.139)</b>	<b>-0.156</b> <b>(0.139)</b>	<b>-0.158</b> <b>(0.139)</b>	<b>-0.043</b> <b>(0.221)</b>	<b>-0.040</b> <b>(0.222)</b>
<b>Agrees a lot</b>	<b>-0.547***</b> <b>(0.139)</b>	<b>-0.510***</b> <b>(0.140)</b>	<b>-0.517***</b> <b>(0.140)</b>	<b>-0.487**</b> <b>(0.218)</b>	<b>-0.477**</b> <b>(0.219)</b>
<b>Reported Discrimination*Combined Parent SEI</b>		0.004 (0.004)			0.004 (0.004)
<b>Reported Discrimination*Has Co-Ethnic Friends</b>			0.349 (0.373)		0.372 (0.374)
<b>Reported Discrimination*Disagrees a little</b>				0.153 (0.289)	0.153 (0.290)
<b>Reported Discrimination*Agrees a little</b>				-0.191 (0.280)	-0.197 (0.281)
<b>Reported Discrimination*Agrees a lot</b>				-0.048 (0.280)	-0.063 (0.281)
<b>Constant</b>	<b>-3.742**</b> <b>(1.574)</b>	<b>-3.846**</b> <b>(1.600)</b>	<b>-3.853**</b> <b>(1.587)</b>	<b>-4.034**</b> <b>(1.586)</b>	<b>-3.658**</b> <b>(1.613)</b>
<b>Observations</b>	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227	3,227

Note: Control variables are hidden from this table. See Table S5 for the table with visible control effects.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Supplementary Table S1. Context of Reception by National Origins**

	<b>Mexico</b>		<b>Colombia</b>		<b>Cuba</b>		<b>Haiti</b>		<b>Laos</b>		<b>Nicaragua</b>		<b>Philippines</b>		<b>Vietnam</b>		<b>N</b>
Prefer English	0.372		0.667		0.820		0.814		0.545		0.734		0.862		0.502		2,203
Prefer HL	0.628		0.333		0.180		0.186		0.455		0.266		0.138		0.498		1,002
No Co-Ethnic Friends	0.030		0.203		0.042		0.083		0.102		0.192		0.021		0.117		198
Has Co-Ethnic Friends	0.970		0.797		0.958		0.917		0.898		0.808		0.979		0.883		2,662
No Reported Discrimination	0.365		0.556		<b>0.627</b>		0.366		0.314		0.479		0.347		0.322		1,442
Reported Discrimination	0.635		0.444		0.373		0.634		0.686		0.521		0.653		0.678		1,763
Agreement with the American Way of Life																	
Weakening Family Ties																	
Disagrees a lot	0.179		0.155		0.233		0.121		0.111		0.156		0.203		0.129		582
Disagrees a little	0.357		0.289		0.361		0.369		0.413		0.308		0.403		0.345		1,142
Agrees a little	0.366		0.303		0.287		0.404		0.354		0.318		0.317		0.379		1,035
Agrees a lot	0.098		0.254		0.120		0.106		0.122		0.218		0.076		0.147		394
Agreement with the U.S. Being the Best																	
Disagrees a lot	0.174		0.262		0.115		0.387		0.109		0.253		0.110		0.112		493
Disagrees a little	0.306		0.312		0.178		0.268		0.240		0.246		0.245		0.202		749
Agrees a little	0.289		0.177		0.255		0.169		0.312		0.212		0.355		0.351		899
Agrees a lot	0.230		0.248		0.452		0.176		0.339		0.290		0.290		0.335		1,046
	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>	
Combined Parent SEI	47.98	19.65	71.03	27.08	78.67	31.02	57.82	28.67	66.74	31.28	70.42	31.29	72.11	22.81	71.11	30.32	